On this six-year anniversary of a major electricity blackout, the United States continues to ignore the lessons of the episode. That disregard exposes the country to another occurrence that could have dire consequences for the U.S. economy and security. As we debate legitimate concerns such as cyber security, privacy, standards, and transmission line siting, we must also remember the lessons of six years ago and move forward quickly in developing a smart grid.
On August 14, 2003, untrimmed trees making contact with a sagging power line in Ohio triggered a cascade of failures that resulted in some 50 million people losing electricity and billions of dollars of loses to the economy. Six years after the massive blackout that swept much of the Northeast U.S. and parts of the Midwest and Canada, our power grid remains highly vulnerable to severe disruption that could imperil our security and economy. The outdated grid is also a major impediment to increased use of renewable and alternative energy. Implementing a next-generation grid must be a priority in generating a 21st century energy blueprint for America.
The acute vulnerability of the grid represents a major threat to America’s resilience. Maintaining the reliable flow of electricity in the event of a crisis is crucial to our ability to rapidly respond and recover, as well as the capacity of businesses to continue operations in such an event. As the 2003 blackout vividly demonstrated, even a minor incident in the current grid can cause massive power failure for a significant period of time. Such vulnerability makes the electric grid a prime target for terrorists. Mass disruptions in electric service during a catastrophe can seriously inhibit the efforts of first responders to aid victims and maintain order, thus endangering lives. Lack of power can also encumber the ability of security and defense forces to operate, leaving America exposed. Additionally, the economic impact of a grid failure can be enormous. The total economic losses attributed to the 2003 blackout range from $7 to $10 billion.
Upgrading to the smart grid will create a much more robust energy infrastructure capable of functioning in the event of a disaster without significant disruption. Its advanced capabilities allow it to anticipate a problem and mitigate its effects on the system. The next-generation grid also possesses security features that make it much more secure from terrorist threats. The highly efficient and reliable grid will also enhance U.S. economic competitiveness by providing savings to firms on energy costs, enhancing productivity through a more dependable supply and creating new markets for “smart” technologies and other digital age innovations.
In addition, the Smart Grid will empower electricity consumers like never before to conserve electricity, which will provide significant savings for financially-strapped families and help to limit carbon emissions. Smart metering and demand response elements will allow consumers to know exactly how much electricity will cost them at a certain time and adjust their usage accordingly. For example, a user can decide to run the dishwasher during off-peak hours, saving the user money and easing demand on the grid, which will reduce the need for more generating capacity.
Let’s not wait for another blackout on the scale of what happened six years ago today. It’s time to work together to make the grid smarter and more reliable and resilient.
Actually, I mostly agree with you and am a smart grid advocate. We certainly are just as vulnerable to a 2003-type blackout today as we were then, perhaps more so. However, I have a couple of questions. First, where is all the money going to come from to build out a smart grid? Obviously utilities will have to raise rates to fund the massive build-out required, and that doesn't even consider the massive cap-and-tax program the current administration wants to impose.
If building out the smart grid, and improved, upgraded transmission, is going to cost trillions of dollars, as most knowledgeable experts admit, how are consumers going to save money. They may reduce their consumption by a possible 8% (according to most studies), but their rates are going to have to go up more than that to pay for all this. Given that the federal government already is technically bankrupt (they just won't admit it), and the dollar likely is to continue to decline in value, where is all this money going to come from? That's the main question I keep asking and no one is providing a reasonable answer. You can't build what you can't afford--the current administration's actions to the contrary notwistanding. Sooner or later the Piper has to be paid.
Are we yet applying an N-2 standard? No. So, yes, the same thing could happen again. Are we "ignoring" the lessons of the blackout? No, the reliability authorities (NERC & FERC) have concluded that the added cost of an N-2 standard are not warranted, despite the possible consequences. You may disagree, but they are not ignoring anything.
Moreover, even six years ago, the grid operators showed remarkable ability to anticipate and respond to grid calamities. Specifically, PJM halted propagation of the blackout on their border, for the most part. My understanding is that, while they didn't predict the blackout, they perceived a higher than usual probability of problems and had requisitioned more resources than was strictly required on that day. Many of their practices have been adopted elsewhere.
It must be acknowledged that while the smart grid will more than pay for itself in the long run with efficiency and reliability enhancements, there will be substantial upfront costs. Government cannot be expected to bear these costs. My concern with the stimulus smart grid grants is that they will create expectations, perhaps even a sense of entitlement, among utilities for even more massive public funding down the road, which is not realistic. The result could be that instead of stimulating private investment, grid modernization stalls as utilities await more government funding.
There's no denying that consumers and utilities will have to bear costs. However, it must be recognized that increased demand will trigger upgrades to the grid and rising electricity costs regardless. Smart grid investments are the most cost effective option.
Some utilities that are moving forward are charging customers a fee for smart meters and then providing pricing options that reward efficiency and off-peak use that allow consumers to more than recoup the expense. In some cases regulatory changes will be required to allow utilities to decouple their profits from the amount of electricity they produce and also to permit them to diversify into other areas. Transforming the grid will increase the value-added services that electricity providers can offer, which will provide additional revenue streams.
As for James' comments, the PJM example he mentions actually makes my case for the need for the smart grid. Michael Kormos of PJM spoke at a Reform Institute conference in March of 2008. At the conference he stated that it was not PJM's actions in real time -- he admitted there was not much they could have done -- but years of advanced regional planning and cooperation with utilities that resulted in a robust system able to withstand the cascading blackout. However, he doubted that the PJM system could withstand such an event today, given that increasing demand coupled with slow growth in generating capacity are stressing the system, reducing the "slack" and thereby diminishing the flexibility and resiliency of the grid. In addition to its more high-voltage power lines and more densely networked lines, the U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force found that the PJM operating area also benefited from being farther away from the source of the cascade, which dampened its effects on the system.
Kormos also noted that a lack of situational awareness in real time was a major factor in the inability to stop the blackout from cascading as far as it did. According to Kormos there were 34 failures over a two-hour period; had any of those failures been caught in time the scope of the blackout could have been significantly reduced. He went on to mention that phasor measurement units, a key aspect of the smart grid, are critical to gaining the situational awareness to ensure that such episodes never happen again. This example illustrates that the ability of grid operators to anticipate and respond to grid calamities has much to be desired and that grid modernization towards a smart grid is needed.
Whoever told you that generation growth has been "slow" is an idiot. From 1998 through 2005, the US completed the largest increment of generation capacity that the world had ever seen. 220gw, as I recall. This has been enhanced through dramatic increases in capacity factors for coal and nuclear. Only more recent Chinese increases compare in total GW. Most of the US has a lot more generation capacity than can be used. That includes PJM west of Harrisburg, which is awash in excess generation. East of Harrisburg, generation is sufficient, but there is a need for some growth in NJ, MD, DC & eastern PA. Btw, load growth is not that great, 1-2% annually.
Transmission is another issue entirely. We need a lot more wire to move power around. Otoh, we are now using reserve resources much more effectively. A major contributor to that has been PJM.
How could the task force have concluded that distance was a factor??? Look at a MAP. The blackout started practically on PJM's doorstep. A more important factor was that PJM was upstream.
Kormos was also correct when he states that no human intervention in real time made any difference. He is also correct that years of regional preparation and planning had worked. PJM successfully stopped propagation through PASSIVE preparation. I am impressed. Moreover, PJM had only been an RTO for two years in 2003. They now have 8-9 years of experience.
Kormos was quite correct that the lack of situational awareness on First Energy's and MISO's part was a critical factor. Their performance was scandalous. However, those problems were addressed several years ago, by 2005. Fyi, on the day of the blackout, PJM had made at least four calls to MISO and FE inquiring about flowgate issues that they were seeing, mostly to the west of FE. Be aware that it is not uncommon for PJM to make such calls.