EWPC sense of urgency is reinforced. As the market architecture and design breakthrough paradigm, EWPC will enable the possibility to a superior development path for the power industry. However, putting EWPC into practice to reap most of the benefits requires high caliber professional advice.
Increased Sense of Urgency of EWPC
By José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity
Copyright © 2007 José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, without written permission from José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio. This article is an unedited, an uncorrected, draft material of The EWPC Textbook. Please write to javs@ieee.org to contact the author for any kind of engagement.
Dear Mr. Gould,
Thank you very much for asking one right question, the one in the first crucial point that reinforces the increased sense of urgency about EWPC. The balance of your comments, however, has distortions and unnecessary repetitions.
In that “crucial point” you are describing the possibility of systemic risk – system adequacy problem - which is one of the main jobs of the system engineer (planner and operator) to be performed in coordination with generators, transporters and retailers. Today's regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation, based on inactive and inelastic demand (and an externality), and lacking customer oriented service, are not prepared to handle the managerial complexity involved.
To handle such complexity, we need to deploy 2GRs before "... electricity should become the mode to replace transportation fuels (PHEV's, H2, etc.)." Several market segments will develop, for example price takers, responsive demand (source of demand elasticity) and long term contracts. As 2GRs come up with the long term contractual commitments of ( i.e. industrial and commercial) customers that desire to buy the right of future electricity service at a fixed price, including those that have serve to finance base load power plants (i.e. via futures market), 2GRs will provide the system operator much more accurate demand forecasts. Such forecasts are better because demand in no longer an externality.
By updating power system planning procedures to EWPC with those quite accurate forecasts, the “projected demand” will NEVER “exceed available supply by a larger margin than the available demand control?” System reserves, in the proper mix of the “elastic” demand side and the supply side, should be adequate to run a stable system.
“How will your grid operator "guarantee" it's existence in all combinations of circumstances?” By proper long run power system planning system adequacy development. The statement “a new 1500 MW nuclear station when demand for it may be only at 100 MW,” is the result of a planning mistake or a misunderstanding of power system operation procedures.
That is why EWPC is the winner of the first phase of competition are precisely highly interrelated "absolute requirements" 1) integration of active demand and 2) that distribution and transmission are fully integrated geographically. Those requirements enable a superior solution path to the PROFIT ZONE through fully functional retail and wholesale competition. The obsolete regulation paradigm shifted the industry to the NO PROFIT ZONE and the deregulation experiments place it in an even more inferior path of development.
As for price caps, they are easily sold to voters. Under EWPC each customer has the right to choose its own price caps in the service plan of their 2GR as explained in No Need for Regulated Price Caps - I and No Need for Regulated Price Caps - II.
Distorting and naming the “absolute requirements” of EWPC as “two minor differences,” is no serious, just as it is also the “the added point” which are repeated again, and again, because Mr. G NEVER followed the links on EWPC is NOT the Ontario Model Either. Comparing the Ontario single generation retailer actions to those of the 2GRs adds insult to injury.
Finally, I repeat the summary of the article Take EWPC Lead & Reap Large Benefits: “The US Congress, the European Commission, the state of Ohio, and the Dominican Republic, are some the most likely candidates to start the paradigm shift to EWPC, ending demand forever as an externality. It has been shown that the days of the obsolete VIUs paradigm are counted. A paradigm shift to EWPC is the next source of business innovations, jobs with a lot of future and increasing exports. Those governments that take the lead, and avoid the risks of market implementation failure by retaining high caliber professional team advice, will reap most of the benefits.”
Best regards,
José Antonio Vanderhorst-Silverio, Ph.D.
Systemic Consultant: Electricity




Jose: [snip] System reserves, in the proper mix of the "elastic" demand side and the supply side, should be adequate to run a stable system.
"How will your grid operator "guarantee" it's existence in all combinations of circumstances?" By proper long run power system planning system adequacy development. The statement "a new 1500 MW nuclear station when demand for it may be only at 100 MW," is the result of a planning mistake or a misunderstanding of power system operation procedures.[/snip]
??should be adequate??
Sounds like there must be some means for the "central planners" to mandate into existence the solutions they identify. What means will that be?
[snip] Comparing the Ontario single generation retailer actions to those of the 2GRs adds insult to injury. [/snip]
In what way exactly will EWPC mandate into existence some theoretically "new" retailer which does not follow market incentives?
Mr. Gould,
Adequate is the key word on system adequacy. Nothing less, nothing more.
Adequate power system planning procedures for the long run are concerned with developing of a grid that takes the information deals of customers, retailers, and generators, already in progress in the commercial market and offers suggestions of new development to generators for future projects. The process is repeated, i.e. year after year.
No debates are necessary for the transportation utility, as its design and development is that of a machine that should operate at ultraquality.
The commecial market, however, has prudential regulations aimed to avoid market power issues and to protect conumers.
A no brainer on "adding insult to injury." Retailers get into the open market by themselves. Those that don't follow incentives go broke under competition with 2GRs that develop business model innovations. Those 2GRs increase their market share.
Jose: "So, I accept right away when I am wrong." -- good one ;<)
In a related matter, e.g. ownership of transmission under EWPC. You state that "all transmission and distribution in an area must be owned and operated by a single "ultraquality" entity. So for example in California or Texas, how does new wind generation get built? Does the generating entity (a private enterprise) simply built whatever quantity of wind generation wherever they want and demand sufficient "ultraquality" transmission to serve it? West Texas to Dallas? Or a large central solar-thermal plant in Nevada wanting to sell to "2GR" retailers in Los Angles? Who pays the bills? Who determines the economics? Does the transmission entity get to design whatever transmission system they want, at whatever cost they want?
Also, what does "ultraquality" mean, specifically?
I too, encourage everyone to follow Jose Antonio's link above, " Increased Sense of Urgency of EWPC" to find the sorts of ethereal answers one gets to any question containing specifics. Simply stating that "all problems are solved because these 2GR retailers are not the same as Ontario's 1GR retailers" is the most evasive of tactics. I was asking for the specific market incentives provided under EWPC to bring about the development of these miraculous new retailers? Why, for example, do they not simply take the path of maximizing profits instead of (installing costly demand management systems on their own subset of customers when the resulting benefits wil accrue equally to all their competitor's customers)?
On another thread, Jose Antonio has provided the following, relevant to my above last question, specifically Len: "Could you please provide an analysis of what incentives might be provided under EWPC for your 2GR retailers to make the investment in smart metering? As I can find no financial incentives in your design for either retailer or customer, I'm curious about why you think any retailer might make such an investment."
Jose: "What better incentives than a piece of the federal retail market of the U.S., "
Len: So it is your theory that a new 2GR retailer in Georgia can be incented to install e.g. $100,000,000 worth of demand management equipment on their 2 million customer subset of all the 5 million customers in Georgia, by offering that retailer contracts to supply power to all the federal buildings in Georgia? Is it then your proposition that the other 3 million customers should simply be ignored, and be served by 1GR retailers?
Wouldn't it be more efficient economically, and more transparent, to simply provide an explicit federal subsidy in the amount required, and let the retailers compete fairly to supply the federal buildings? Or implement IMEUC, which simply acknowledges the market failure within the design and requires the "market manager" to install the equipment and take payback for it in rate charges.
I would also point out that whomever "pays for the equipment" should benefit from its installation. Since the equipment properly done should zero out the transaction costs to generation of dealing with individual consumers, and the consumers have to pay for the equipment (either through Jose's hidden subsidies or by other means) then it should be the consumers, not the "2GR" retailers, who benefit, by giving them open access to the standard market's wholesale prices, immediately.
As I break for lunch, this was written in response of the first two posts, but actually responds on all four
Two good practical questions, Len. The other is a repeat of repeats.
Agree that I said "all transmission and distribution in an area must be owned and operated by a single 'ultraquality' entity." Vertical integration had such rights of ownership under its obligation to serve. EWPC will have its obligation to transport under regulation. Procedures under regulation will be developed to solve them. Regulators will have price controls for transportation, but not for end-customers energy use.
One example of ultraquality is the loss of load probability of 24 accumulated hours expected in 10 years. That was used in the industry when it was reliable. Much lower expected probabilities should be developed for the smart grid with the help of demand integration.
One part of the response on Ontario 1GR is already posted in a comment under Increased Sense of Urgency of EWPC (http://www.energyblogs.com/ewpc/index.cfm/2007/11/...). The other part is in EWPC is NOT the Ontario Model Either (http://www.energyblogs.com/ewpc/index.cfm/2007/11/...), which refers to the same question already repeated after No Need for Regulated Price Caps - I (http://www.energyblogs.com/ewpc/index.cfm/2007/10/...), which proves that Len doesn't follow the links. Please find the response on No Need for Regulated Price Caps - II (http://www.energyblogs.com/ewpc/index.cfm/2007/10/...I), where it is crystal clear that "the resulting benefits will" NOT "accrue equally to all their competitor's customers" when they don't respond.
I will add that NO retailer will be so dumb to believe the idea to "take[s] the path of maximizing profits instead of (installing costly demand management systems on their own subset of customers," because under EWPC he/she will needs to pay a lot of money in the wholesale market for his economic transactions.
Thanks for endorsing to hit the link to read the article. I suggest they start by reading EWPC is NOT the Ontario Model Either (http://www.energyblogs.com/ewpc/index.cfm/2007/11/...).